Fish-i investigation: 14

Serial offenders in Somalia

While Somalia is rebuilding its capacity to control fishing activity in its exclusive economic zone (EEZ), some vessel operators repeatedly disregard the laws and regulations and take advantage of the fact that Somalia still has limited capacity to police their waters. This case demonstrates how a group of Chinese longliners have repeatedly, over several years, been fishing illegally in Somalia. Somalia raised this issue with the flag State China, but to date the vessels are still operating without sanction.

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Key events

March 2015

Seven tuna longliners from China were observed operating in the EEZ of Somalia. They all were on the authorized vessel list of the regional fisheries management organisation (RFMO) the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC), however they did not request authorisation to enter Somali waters or apply for fishing licences, and were therefore operating in the Somali EEZ illegally. Somalia raised the issue with flag State China through the IOTC.

November 2015

Due diligence checking took place when two of these vessels the LU QIING YUAN YU 102 and LU QIING YUAN YU 106 applied for fishing licences from Kenya. This revealed that in May 2015, fishing licences for these two vessels were purchased from the Federal Government of Somalia. The licences had been bought, via the company Deepsea Fisheries Management Ltd., a known agent/operator that has links to Eastward Exim & Shipping PTE Ltd, the operator of several vessels that fished using forged licences in the EEZ of Tanzania in 2013.

April to May 2016

Automatic identification system (AIS) tracks again indicate that several vessels, including the LU QING YUAN YU 101, LU QING YUAN YU 102 and LU QING YUAN YU 107 are operating without licences in the Somali EEZ. Contact was made with the flag State China who would have access to vessel monitoring system (VMS) data for each of the vessels and would be able to verify their location.

July 2016 to January 2017

Continued monitoring of the LU QING YUAN YU fleet and other Chinese vessels showed unusual movement patterns on AIS, with tracks showing vessels ‘jumping’ distances of approximately 2 500 nautical miles north to south or vice versa over periods of less than an hour, whilst showing no significant change in longitude. These position anomalies may or may not be deliberate and ongoing investigations will help to confirm whether these Chinese longliners were continuing to fish without licences in Somali waters.

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How?

The evidence uncovered during FISH-i investigations demonstrates different methods or approaches that illegal operators use to either commit or cover-up their illegality and to avoid prosecution.

Vessel identity

One of the vessel’s identity was unknown, its AIS is not linked to any identity information.

Flagging issues (suspected)

Indonesian and Taiwan flags were used by the vessels, but due to the identity issues it is suspected that these may have been false flags.

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What did FISH-i Africa do?

• Tracked the vessels via AIS and identified the AIS anomaly.
• Exchanged information between FISH-i countries and IOTC.

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What worked?

• Regional cooperation and information exchange between FISH-i countries allowed licensing authorities to crosscheck and verify information.
• AIS tracking allowed the vessels to be monitored.

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What needs to change?

• Flag States need to act when there is evidence of non-compliance in their fleet.
• Strong national policies are needed with clear guidance on licensing conditions.
• Publicly available licence lists would help to reduce forgery and fraud within the fisheries sector.
• Mandatory AIS is needed for all commercial fishing vessels to ensure their activity can be tracked and monitored at all times.